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Abstract: According to Aquinas, the souls in heaven (hereafter, the blessed) are 
both necessitated (i.e., determined) and free in their choice to love God. But if 
Aquinas is right, it may seem that we cannot give an incompatibilist account of 
the freedom of the souls in heaven to love God. Roughly put, incompatibilism is 
the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. In this paper, I take 
inspiration from Kevin Timpe and Timothy Pawl’s account of the impeccability 
of the blessed to argue for a more refined view of incompatibilism, consistent 
with some of the literature, according to which free will is compatible with a 
certain kind of determinism. I then modify Timpe and Pawl’s account along 
Thomistic lines, removing a problematic character–based contingency, to argue 
that anyone, regardless of character, is necessitated to love God in the beatific 
vision—necessitated in a sense consistent with incompatibilism. 
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1. Aquinas on the Beatific Vision 
 
Aquinas maintains that whosoever has the beatific vision will by natural necessity love 
God; he writes, “the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves 
whatever He loves” (ST I–II.4)1, and God necessarily loves Himself. Call inancarability 
the property of being incapable of not loving God. As Eleonore Stump explains, for 
Aquinas, the blessed are both free and inancaritable; they are free but determined to 
love God. Stump writes, “their inability to will anything but the good stems not from 
any extrinsic coercion being exercised on their wills but rather from the clear view their 
intellects have of the nature of the good” (Stump 2005, 299). The blessed are determined 
by ‘natural necessity’. A person wills something by natural necessity if it appears good 
to him and if he cannot view it as in any way not good. One’s own happiness, and 
anything that one perceives is necessarily connected with it, is willed by natural necessity 
                                               
1 I use the text at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/, the translation by the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province for the Summa. 
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in this way (Stump 2005, 280–281). So God is loved, or willed, by natural necessity in the 
beatific vision, according to Aquinas. 
Consider Stump’s version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). 
 
(PAP) A person has free will with regard to (or is morally responsible for) an 
action A only if he could have done otherwise than A (Stump 2005, 299). 
 
According to Stump, Aquinas rejects PAP (regarding acts of will) (Stump 2005, 299). 
Since some kinds of necessity, such as the necessity of natural inclination, are 
compatible with freedom, Aquinas believes that it is possible for there to be cases in 
which a person has free will with regard to an action, but could not have done otherwise 
(Stump 2005, 300). Given Aquinas’s views about the natural necessitation of the will and 
the nature of the beatific vision, PAP is false in the beatific vision since the intellect 
pellucidly establishes that willing the (specific) good (God) is in every respect superior 
to any other available option, and so the intellect necessitates that the will loves God. 
Tobias Hoffmann and Cyrille Michon also affirm that Aquinas regards the love the 
blessed have for God as a case of natural necessity: 
 
Since the will as rational appetite is ordered to the good understood by reason, when 
something inevitably appears to us as good from every perspective, we cannot but desire 
it. Such a thing is happiness (ST 1a2ae.10.2 c., QDM 6 c. lines 429–35). Similarly, the 
blessed human beings and angels — who, according to Christian teaching, see God as he 
is — necessarily understand that God is the essence of goodness, and for this reason they 
cannot but love him (ST 1a.62.8, ST 1a.82.2) (Hoffmann and Michon 2017, 4). 
 
 For Aquinas it is the ‘clear view’ of the intellect that necessitates love of God in the 
beatific vision. Since any intellect in the beatific vision has a clear view of God, and since 
all persons have intellects, the love of God that is necessitated in the beatific vision does 
not depend on any contingent features of persons. Any person, just because of essential 
properties of personhood (such as intellect, will, and the power of rational choice) is 
necessitated to love God, by the very vision of God itself. 
Is Aquinas, then, an incompatibilist or a compatibilist? This question is more 
complicated than it may appear—for instance, it just isn’t clear how PAP relates to 
(in)compatibilism—and so I will address it at the end of the essay. For now, let’s clarify 
Aquinas’s ‘rejection’ of PAP. Notice an ambiguity in PAP, for it can be read, one way, as: 
 
(PAPnow) A person has free will with regard to (or is morally responsible for) an 
action A only if he could have done otherwise than A at the moment of choice. 
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Call any incompatibilist–free action which satisfies PAPnow a directly free act. Then PAP 
can be read a second way as, 
 
(PAPdistal) A person has free will with regard to (or is morally responsible for) an 
action A only if he could have done otherwise than A had he performed, prior to the 
moment of choice, different directly free acts from those he actually performed. 
 
Some incompatibilists believe that PAPnow is necessary (but not sufficient) for freedom 
insofar as an act is free only if it is directly free. Call this view leeway incompatibilism. 
Other incompatibilists believe that an act is free as long as it satisfies PAPnow or PAPdistal. 
Call this view sourcehood incompatibilism. Although Aquinas’s views are inconsistent 
with leeway incompatibilism, nothing I have attributed to Aquinas so far is inconsistent 
with sourehood incompatibilism. 
 
2. Proximal determinism and incompatibilism: Timpe and Pawl on impeccability 
 
Kevin Timpe and Timothy Pawl seem to accept something like sourcehood 
incompatibilism in their attempt to show how there can be incompatibilist freedom2 and 
an inability to sin—impeccability—in heaven. They start from James Sennett’s proposal 
(Sennett 1999). Sennett argues that agents in heaven are proximately determined by their 
own characters, which were shaped by earlier remotely undetermined actions. This “self–
imposed determinism,” as Timpe and Pawl call it in their exegesis, does not, according 
to Sennett, rule out free will (Timpe and Pawl 2009, 404–405). 
As Timpe and Pawl write, quoting Sennett, “an event is remotely undetermined just in 
case there is some time in the past such that the laws of nature and the state of the world 
at that time do not entail that the event will occur” and “an event is proximately 
determined just in case the laws of nature and the state of the world at some time 
immediately prior to the event entail that the event will occur” (Timpe and Pawl 2009, 
405). If an act is proximately determined by “earlier free and undetermined activity” 
(Timpe and Pawl 2009, 404), it is free because its freedom “traces back” to the earlier, 
undetermined, activity (ibid.). Hence, for Sennett, “an agent can be free at time t only if 
that agent is undetermined at t or [is] such that what determines the agent’s actions at t 
is the result of previous free and undetermined choices of that agent” (Timpe and Pawl 
2009, 406). Among Sennett’s remotely undetermined events are, I think, directly free acts.3 
Timpe and Pawl advance a position “very much like Sennett’s” (Timpe and Pawl 2009, 
407). They say, 
                                               
2 See Timpe and Pawl (2009, 399), where they assume incompatibilism for the paper. 
3 In fact, I believe Sennett would consider directly free acts to be proximately undetermined events; see 
Timpe and Pawl (2009, 405). 
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During pre–heavenly existence a person has the ability to form a moral character which 
later precludes that person from willing certain things… But it doesn’t follow that we 
aren’t free, particularly given that our evaluative conclusions are not necessitated 
products of causally external forces… our freely formed characters precludes us from 
doing morally bad actions insofar as those characters lead us to evaluate reasons for 
acting, or not acting, in certain ways (Timpe and Pawl 2009, 407). 
 
How does one’s character ‘preclude’ certain actions? Timpe and Pawl “think that one’s 
character directs decisions by both influencing what one sees as reasons for actions and 
influencing how one weighs reasons for and against those actions,” influencing both the 
‘weights’ and the ‘scales’, so to speak (Timpe and Pawl 2009, 407). One’s character 
influences what reasons would motivate one to act, and how one would weigh those 
reasons against other motivational reasons. The blessed are impeccable because “given 
the perfection of their character, they will see no reason to engage in sinful and wicked 
actions” (Timpe and Pawl 2009, 408). 
In a later book (Timpe 2014), Timpe provides a more robust account of how character 
determines the wills of the blessed. Drawing out some implications from van Inwagen 
(van Inwagen 1989), Timpe argues that free choice is constrained by reasons: an agent A 
never freely chooses to do an action X at time t if A has no reason for X–ing at t. More 
formally, 
 
Reasons–constraint on free choice: If, at time t, A has neither any motivational 
intellectual reasons for X–ing nor any motivational affective reasons for X–ing, 
then A is incapable, at t, of freely choosing to X (Timpe 2014, 23).4 
 
Commenting on his and Pawl’s earlier paper that the blessed are incompatibilist–free 
and impeccable, Timpe remarks that “though we did not put our initial defense of… the 
view in terms of the reasons–constraint on free will, it should be clear that something 
similar to it is at the heart of our earlier account” (Timpe 2014, 87). In particular, Timpe 
argues that the blessed, whose moral character is “perfected and whose motivational 
reasons perfectly align with the normative reasons for acting in a particular way (and 
not acting in others)” (Timpe 2014, 88), simply cannot see any reason for sinning. Given 
                                               
4 Timpe contrasts motivational with normative reasons, where the former are “the reasons that an agent 
has for doing a particular action and are capable of explaining her choice is she were to perform that 
action” (Timpe 2014, 22), and the latter are those reasons “which would morally justify a particular choice 
by the agent at a particular time, regardless of whether the agent actually considers them” (ibid.). Timpe 
further distinguishes two kinds of motivational reasons: intellectual (“involves the agent judging that the 
content of the end is good, and thus desirable”) (ibid.), and affective (“doesn’t involve an intellectual 
judgment by the agent that the content is good, but rather an emotional response toward that content”) 
(ibid.). 
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all the psychological facts about each of the blessed, it is “psychologically impossible” 
for each to sin (ibid.).  
For Timpe and Pawl, an intellectually–determined act can be a free act, provided that 
the agent’s “evaluative conclusions are not necessitated products of causally external 
forces,” but are determined by the agent’s own (directly–) freely formed character 
(Timpe and Pawl, 2004, 407). This is a sourcehood incompatibilist view, since it affirms 
the PAPdistal or PAPnow requirement on any free act. 
 
3.1. The Inancaritability of the Blessed 
 
Based on the foregoing considerations, I assume that the following Master Analysis of 
Free Will is acceptable to at least some sourcehood incompatibilists. 
 
Master Analysis of Free Will: A subject S’s choice ɸ is incompatibilist–free just in 
case (A1) it is not remotely determined, and (A2) S has the right kind of control 
over ɸ. 
 
And so, the following Master Account of the Beatific Vision should be acceptable to at least 
some incompatibilists. 
 
Master Account of the Beatific Vision: 
(B1) Anyone who sees God necessarily chooses to love God. 
(B2) The choice to love God is proximally5 but not remotely determined. 
(B3) The subject has the right kind of control over the choice’s proximal 
determination to be incompatibilist–free in relation to the choice. 
 
Hence, according to the Master Account of the Beatific Vision, anyone who sees God is 
incompatibilist–free to love God, and necessitated to love God. 
                                               
5 Sennett defined proximately determined events; here I refer to proximally determined events. The 
difference is of minor concern.  By ‘proximal determinism’ I mean to capture the idea that some event Ѱ at 
time t2 is necessitated by some event ɸ at some earlier time t1, where t1 could be very close to t2. Thus, 
where L is  the proposition completely describing the laws of nature, Q is the proposition that ɸ at t1 
occurs, and R is the proposition completely describing the way the world is at t1 (so R will actually include 
or entail ɸ, but I include it for clarity), then event Ѱ is proximally determined by an event ɸ =df. the 
conjunction of Q, R, and L entails that Ѱ occurs after ɸ occurs. The main difference between proximately- 
and proximally-determined events is that proximately-determined events (Sennett’s) can only be 
determined by states of the world immediately prior to their occurrence, whereas proximally-determined 
events (my term) can be determined by states of the world that are more past-distant from them. The 
reason I prefer my term is that a person’s character could be formed in the way Timpe and Pawl suggest 
long before he enters heaven. 
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As I read Timpe and Pawl, they provide a compelling incompatibilist solution to the 
impeccability of the blessed. Timpe and Pawl’s account is particularly important in its 
specification, at least to some degree, of what the right kind of control indicated in (A2) 
and, by extension, (B3), consists in. In particular, Timpe and Pawl give us a plausible 
account of the right kind of control in instances of necessitated free choice not to sin. I 
believe we can generalize that account as follows: 
 
(Control): An agent S has the right kind of control over S’s necessitated choice ɸ not 
to do something in circumstances C just in case (C1) ɸ is not remotely 
determined; (C2) ɸ is proximally determined by features of S’s character U; (C3) S 
had the power, through directly free actions, to prevent S’s developing U, such 
that (C4) S had the power to render false the proposition that if S were in C, S 
would be necessitated to choose ɸ. 
 
I should clarify immediately that C in (Control) is not a set of fully–specified 
circumstances (e.g., circumstances including the whole history of the world up until the 
relevant choice of S’s); otherwise (C4) would be false for the blessed, since the history of 
the world includes their directly–freely forming their characters. Rather, C is a subset of 
fully–specified circumstances pertaining to some event, excluding those events in the 
agential participants’ histories which were directly free actions and which necessitated 
the event. 
On Timpe and Pawl’s account of the impeccability of the blessed, (C1) the choice not 
to sin is not remotely determined, (C2) the choice is proximally determined by features 
of the character of the blessed, according to which they simply cannot see any reason for 
sinning, (C3) the blessed had the power, in situations in which PAPnow was satisfied, to 
prevent their developing those features of character, such that (C4) the blessed had the 
power to render false the proposition that, in the beatific vision, they would always 
choose not to sin. Condition (C3) captures the PAPdistal (or PAPnow) requirement on any 
free act.  
It is tempting to think that Timpe and Pawl’s account of impeccability explains, or 
can be straightforwardly adapted to explain, inancaritability. However, there are two 
problems with a straightforward adaptation of their account. First, their account 
concerns inaction (not sinning), whereas inancaritability concerns action (loving God). 
Perhaps this is not problematic, since perhaps Timpe and Pawl’s account of 
impeccability could just be rephrased. Or perhaps it would be a sin not to love God, 
however robust that action is, in which case Timpe and Pawl’s account would explain 
inancaritability.6  
                                               
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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However, the major problem with adapting Timpe and Pawl’s account to cover 
inancaritability is that, on the adapted account, a person’s response to the vision of God 
would be character–dependent. Yet it is overwhelmingly implausible that anyone, 
regardless of character, would fail to love God upon seeing Him. So there must be 
nothing contingent about an agent involved in the necessitated love of the beatific vision. 
But Timpe and Pawl seem to explain impeccability by a contingent feature of the 
blessed, namely their directly–freely–developed characters. It is possible, on Timpe and 
Pawl’s account, that an agent could see God and yet fail to love Him by sinning. On a 
more plausible account of freedom in the beatific vision, this should be impossible. 
According to Aquinas, God Himself, the object of love, necessitates that love through 
‘natural necessity’. It is the ‘clear vision’ of God had by the intellect—any agential 
intellect—and not the (contingent) character of a person, that necessitates in the beatific 
vision. If Aquinas’s psychology is not convincing, just try to think of a reason to render 
intelligible someone’s free refusal to love God upon clearly seeing God as the object of 
his eternal beatitude. Luke Henderson, in a recent paper critical of character–based 
impeccability, argues that character development is simply unnecessary for 
impeccability (Henderson 2014, 324–326). He notes that this was a common view among 
the medievals: 
 
Many of the medieval theologians and philosophers who considered these issues also 
seemed to affirm that the blessed would be perpetually detained in their impeccable 
states by God’s activity in heaven. Some thought that God somehow directly caused the 
blessed to be perpetually impeccable; some thought that God indirectly caused the 
blessed to be perpetually impeccable by producing an internal devotion or love or 
happiness that the blessed will find impossible to ignore or reject (Henderson 2014, 325). 
 
Regarding God’s ‘indirectly causing’ impeccability, Henderson remarks that when there 
is a psychological constraint, “the constraint is brought about by their [the blesseds’] 
relation to God once they see him or are properly related to him in heaven” (ibid). This 
appears to be an accurate general characterization of Aquinas’s position. Henderson 
gives two main reasons, independent of Aquinas, for thinking that character 
development is unnecessary for impeccability. First, he argues that it’s consistent with 
libertarian freedom for a person to make just one directly free choice “to allow God to 
take responsibility for the impeccability of her future character” (Henderson 2014, 325). 
Second, most if not all mere humans do not develop impeccable characters prior to 
death (ibid). If our antemortem character traits do not render us us impeccable in this 
life, why should they do so in the life to come?7 To these I add a further consideration: 
                                               
7 ‘Purgatory,’ you say? Perhaps you think that there is room for further postmortem character 
development.  But either the souls in purgatory are impeccable or they are not.  If they are, the problem of 
explaining why given antemortem peccability arises.  If they are not, then I do not see how God can 
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given Biblical (Lk 23: 39–43) and historical evidence of ‘deathbed conversions’ which 
appear to be efficacious for salvation, we have some reason to think that not everyone in 
heaven developed his character along the virtuous lines necessary for impeccability 
prior to his death. 
With these difficulties in mind, let’s start from Timpe and Pawl’s account of 
impeccability and see if we can come up with an account of inancaritability. I begin with 
a modified constraint: 
 
Reasons–constraint on inaction: If, at time t, S is presented with a forced choice: if at t 
S has no reasons for doing anything other than ɸ (at t), and if S has reasons for 
doing ɸ (at t), then S necessarily does ɸ at t. 
 
By ‘forced choice’ I refer to Jamesian–type forced options. According to William James, 
“every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility of not 
choosing, is an option” (or choice) which is forced (James 2009, 550). There is no third 
option, unlike in, say, the case in which someone is presented with the choice whether to 
go outside with or without an umbrella. In that case, the person can refrain from making 
a choice; he can not go outside at all. If S is presented with a forced choice, however, 
then S must do something, must ‘make a choice.’ The basic thought underlying the 
Reasons–constraint on inaction is that if S is forced to choose to do something or other, and 
only has reasons for doing one thing, then—since in rationally choosing S must act for 
reasons—S will do the only thing that S has any reasons to do. There is no other way for 
S to exercise S’s power of rational choice. Hence the necessity here is de re. The Reasons–
constraint on inaction should seem quite plausible. 
The blessed are in a position in which the antecedent elements of the Reasons–
constraint on inaction are satisfied. In the first place, the blessed are presented with a 
forced choice, viz., whether to love God. There is no ‘third option’ here: either one 
chooses to love God or not. If one ‘turns away’ or does nothing, then one chooses not to 
love God. In this sense, Scripture (e.g., Revelation 19:6–9) suggests that the beatific 
vision can be likened to a marriage proposal. The analogy is not perfect, but in general, 
when a man proposes to a woman, the woman has two, not three, options. It might 
seem that she can accept, reject, or perhaps ‘turn off’ her will and do nothing. But the 
last option is unrealistic; how or why would the woman ‘turn off’ her will? Given the 
immediacy and directness of the proposal, if she does not accept it, then she rejects it. In 
the beatific vision, God proposes a kind of marriage, an indelible union; the choice is 
whether to accept or reject. 
                                                                                                                                                        
guarantee that they freely form their characters so as to become impeccable.  (For instance, God can’t 
determine their characters, since doing so would compromise their freedom.)  Then God has the same 
problem in purgatory that He had on earth, viz., trying to ensure (without determining) that everyone 
freely loves Him. 
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Secondly, anyone in the beatific vision—regardless of character—has reasons for 
loving God, and has no reasons for doing anything other than loving God. In Timpe and 
Pawl’s account of impeccability, the fact that the blessed have no reasons to sin seems to 
be explained most directly by their contingent, developed characters: they have, through 
Sennett’s remotely undetermined acts, formed their characters in such a way that they 
are so virtuous that nothing will count, or count with any weight, to them as a reason to 
sin. But we must rid ourselves of the contingency in Timpe and Pawl’s account; and I 
think we can do so by telling a slightly different story, one inspired by Aquinas. 
Consider a general characterization of the vision of God. The beatific vision is 
superintelligible: a person who sees God knows the truth (the whole truth) and all of his 
ignorance is dispelled (nothing but the truth!). Since God is in fact, according to 
Aquinas,8 every person’s final end, and the satisfaction of every human desire, those 
who see God know this. They know that there is a necessary (in the strongest, broadest, 
most unconstrained modal sense!) connection between God and their own happiness. 
Aquinas says, 
 
They who are already blessed in heaven apprehend the object of true happiness as 
making their happiness and last end: otherwise their desire would not be set at rest in 
that object, and they would not be blessed and happy. The will of the blessed therefore 
cannot swerve from the object of true happiness (SCG IV.92, paragraph 4, quoted in 
Timpe 2014, 83). 
 
In light of the superintelligbility of the beatific vision, there cannot be any normative, 
motivational, or explanatory reason (or apparent reason) whatsoever not to love God; 
moreover, there must be overwhelming reason (and apparent reason) to love God. This 
story satisfies the antecedent parts of the Reasons–constraint on inaction. It also entirely 
removes the, in my view, exceedingly implausible contingency from the choice to love 
God in the beatific vision: any person having the vision of God necessarily loves God 
because of the reality he perceives, along with features essential to his personhood, viz., 
his agency, and in particular, his intellect, will, and power of rational choice. Anyone 
having the beatific vision loves God by natural necessity, “the sort of necessity by which 
the will wills, for example, those things whose goodness is overwhelmingly apparent to 
the agent” (Stump 2005, 298–299). 
 
3.2. Control, the beatific vision, and two problems 
 
But by removing the contingency within the beatific vision—by making the necessitated 
choice to love God entirely independent of a person’s character—have I given an 
                                               
8 “Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence” (ST 
I.II.3.8). 
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account which the incompatibilist will reject? It seems so, since it seems that (C4) in 
(Control) is no longer satisfied! The blessed, on my suggestion, do not have the power to 
render false the proposition that, if they were in the beatific vision, they would love 
God. No one has that power! Timpe and Pawl’s account of impeccability seems to 
suggest that the blessed have the right kind of control for freedom over their heavenly 
actions because they could have developed their characters such that they would have 
acted otherwise in the beatific vision. On their account, the blessed control their decision 
not to sin (and perhaps, by extension, to love God) insofar as it is determined by their 
own characters, which they formed in choice–situations involving indeterminism. 
Timpe and Pawl could follow Robert Kane (Kane 1996), for instance, at least inasmuch 
as they could argue that the relevant choice–situations involved ‘self–forming actions’ 
regarding which the actors had incompatibilist–friendly alternative possibilities. It is 
this control, in virtue of directly–freely self–formed character, that explains the freedom 
of the blessed. 
Now, I think this initially plausible account of Timpe and Pawl’s is just unacceptable. 
Even an abjectly vicious person, if he sees God, will necessarily love God. How could 
someone, with eyes fully opened, possibly refrain from loving God, the object of his 
every desire? But in dropping character from the equation, I seem to have dropped the 
control that most (perhaps all) incompatibilists will demand for an account of free 
action. It is unclear that the blessed have any more control over their love of God, in 
view of its proximal determinism, than they would relative to an alternative in which 
their love is remotely determined. Call this the Control Problem for my account of 
inancaritability. 
Fear not, however; there’s a way of getting control back into the equation. Before 
showing you the way, I want to consider another apparent problem for my account. I 
think that, given God’s infinite love for each individual person, and given that if a 
person doesn’t end up in heaven he ends up in (traditionally ‘grim’) hell, most 
Christians should be committed to, 
 
Inexhaustible divine effort: God saves (ensures the salvation of) every human 
person it is possible for God to save. 
 
On Inexhaustible divine effort, if any person is damned, it is absolutely impossible for God 
to save him. In my view, given its Biblical warrant,9 Christians should at least be 
committed to affirming a second relevant proposition, viz., that hell is an epistemic 
possibility. For all we know, some persons end up in hell. One way of consistently 
affirming both Inexhaustible divine effort and the possibility of hell is to tell a story about 
how free will is required for salvation, and how even God cannot force or, more 
                                               
9 E.g., Revelation 21:8; Matthew 25:41-46; Matthew 13:50; Mark 9:43; etc. 
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accurately, guarantee that someone freely do something. For Aquinas, for example, the 
(free) love of God, which is called charity, is necessary for salvation.10 So in order to 
affirm the possibility of hell, were I a good Thomist, I would have to tell a story 
according to which even God cannot guarantee that someone freely love Him. Timpe 
and Pawl could tell some such story, if they wished, since they could say that the 
necessitated love of God in the beatific vision is, like impeccability, ultimately 
dependent on a person’s freely–formed character. Plausibly, Timpe and Pawl could tell 
a story according to which inancaritability satisfies (Control). But a similar story does 
not appear to be available to me. In fact, it looks like I am committed to universal 
salvation, since all God has to do to guarantee that anyone—regardless of his 
character—love God, is to grant that person a vision of the divine essence. Since this 
seems possible for God to do for every person, and since it necessarily leads to loving 
God, and hence to salvation, then it seems impossible, given Inexhaustible divine effort, 
that any person go to hell. Call this the Universalism Problem for my account of 
inancaritability. 
The solution to both the Control Problem and the Universalism Problem is that the vision 
of God in some sense presupposes what it necessitates. Here’s an overview of the 
solution. First, I’ll turn to Aquinas for some exposition regarding what is required for 
the beatific vision. It will turn out that an agent must make a particular directly free act 
in order to see God. Then I will offer two proposals for why this implies freedom in the 
beatific vision. On the Policy Proposal, the idea is that the directly free act involves the 
maintenance of a psychological state that ‘counts’ for the agent’s agency, and that has 
necessitated love of God as its object. On the Mystical Proposal, the idea is that the 
directly free act concerns an act–token numerically identical with the token act of loving 
God in the beatific vision. Antemortem, the act is contingent and requires faith; 
postmortem, sight necessitates it. 
 
3.2.1. What is required to see God? 
 
Describing how the blessed actually ‘see’ God, Aquinas laboriously explains that God 
cannot be seen or known in the way anything else is seen or known, e.g., by the 
intellect’s ‘abstracting’ God’s essential features in order to form a concept of God, or by 
there being an ‘impression’ of God in the intellect. These standard methods of 
perceiving, seeing, or knowing are strictly impossible in relation to God, since, e.g., 
                                               
10 See, e.g., ST I-II.5.6, in which Aquinas says that the beatific vision (there referred to as ‘Happiness’) is 
the reward of works of virtue.  But true virtue, according to ST II-II.23.7, is impossible without charity.  
Charity is the ‘benevolent friendship’ that consists in love of God (St II-II.23.1), and it must be a free act, 
since God will not unilaterally make a human will having “a right tendency” to God (ST I-II.5.7).  The 
‘right tendency’ is charity, love ordered to God (see ST II-II.26.1).  One can only have charity through, and 
because of, the reception of sanctifying grace (see ST I-II.110.4 ad 1). 
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God’s essence cannot be abstracted and knowledge of any concept or impression would 
not be knowledge of God Himself (ST Suppl.92.1). God cannot be seen through any 
medium whatever (ST Suppl.92.1 ad 15). The only possible way for a human person to 
see God, according to Aquinas, is for God Himself to be “united to our intellect as its 
form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby it is understood”. 
Aquinas continues, “When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul, together 
with the indwelling Divine essence... the Divine essence will be to the intellect as form to 
matter” (ST Suppl.92.1). God is seen through Himself, as He sees Himself. Thus in the 
beatific vision a person’s intellect and God become, not one thing simply–speaking, but 
“one as regards the act of understanding” (ST Suppl.92.1 ad 8). 
So, Aquinas is quite clear that the beatific vision does not just involve the blesseds’ 
knowing about God. Propositional knowledge of that sort is the product of standard 
cases of perception. The blessed know God, in Himself, through Himself, by uniting 
themselves with God, so that it can truly be said that the entire divine essence—the 
three person of the Trinity11—dwells inside the blessed. 
Can God unilaterally decide to take up residence ‘inside’ of a person, to ‘unite’ God’s 
entire being with that person’s? The answer must be ‘no.’ A union of this all–embracing, 
absolutely comprehensive sort—like a nuptial union—is necessarily bilateral: it requires 
an act of will on the part of both parties. The vision of God is not a passive affair, a mere 
perceptual exchange. Aquinas is unambiguous about this too. Responding specifically to 
the objection that God could simply unite with the intellect and that the will would 
‘follow,’ Aquinas replies that certain acts of the will are necessary antecedently to 
certain acts of the intellect (ST I–II.4.4 ad 2). Referring to the beatific vision as 
‘Happiness,’ Aquinas states definitively, 
 
Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. 
Antecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. 
Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to 
matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed 
thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none 
can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of the will (ST I–II.4.4). 
 
We can say even more, since Aquinas tells us which free choice is necessary (and 
sufficient) for salvation (for ‘Happiness’): the choice to cease resisting God’s offer of 
sanctifying grace, to permit God’s grace to enter the soul and thereby to form an intimate 
union of love with God. For it is through the freely–accepted gift of grace that God 
begins to dwell within the human person, beginning the process of “regeneration or re–
                                               
11 “Therefore, since we are made lovers of God by the Holy Spirit, and every beloved is in the lover as 
such, by the Holy Spirit necessarily the Father and the Son dwell in us also” (SCG IV.21 paragraph 3). 
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creation” (ST I–II.110.4), of rectification of the will; and only then can a person love God 
with charity,12 making his soul fit for the beatific vision: 
 
there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be 
present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the 
rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, 
according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but 
also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the 
reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except 
sanctifying grace (ST I.43.3). 
 
It is fairly difficult satisfactorily to explain how a person welcomes God’s grace into his 
soul.13 I’m just going to assume two things about it. First, I assume that a person’s doing 
so involves his making an act of will that satisfies PAPnow. Thus, God’s indwelling a 
person—which is necessary (antemortem) and sufficient (postmortem) for the very 
possibility of the beatific vision—is under the control of the person in a robustly 
incompatibilist sense, since it is directly free. Second, whatever the details of how a 
person welcomes God into his soul, it is true to characterize him as performing, in some 
sense, an act of love for God. 
Here, then, is a general picture of how someone sees God: while on earth she makes a 
directly free act of union with God, by which she receives God’s sanctifying grace into 
her soul and the Godhead begins to dwell inside of her. As long as she does not reject 
God’s indwelling union, her will—her entire soul—is “rectified” by God, is fitted to an 
absolutely comprehensive union with God in heaven. This rectification is only 
completed after death. After she dies, she is able to see God, as He sees Himself, because 
of the fitness of her soul to be comprehensively united with God. Had she not made a 
directly free act of union with God, or had she subsequently severed that union, she 
would not have been able to see God after death. 
But this picture still does not explain why the blessed are free in heaven. It looks like 
the blessed have antemortem control (sufficient for free action) over whether they love 
God, which control is necessary for a love–necessitating postmortem vision. But why 
should we think that exercising past–control over some present event renders an agent 
free regarding the present event? Why should past power or control bestow present 
control, and hence present freedom?14 Timpe and Pawl make some headway here: the 
                                               
12 Sanctifying grace is necessary for charity; see ST I-II.110.4 ad 1. 
13 See Stump 2005, 399-402.  Stump’s account is complicated by anti-Pelagian concerns and by 
Aquinas’s intellectualism. 
14 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this important objection, in words quite similar to those 
I’ve used here. Thanks to the same referee for helpful remarks clarifying my position vis-a-vis Timpe and 
Pawl’s. 
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relevant past power is over the agent’s own character, and (their suggestion is) actions 
whose ultimate source is one’s own freely–formed character are free, even if they are 
necessary. I’ve rejected Timpe and Pawl’s character–based account of freedom in 
heaven, so I need to say something about why past control bestows present control. I’ll 
give two independent proposals, both highly tentative and cursory. 
 
3.2.2. The Policy Proposal 
 
The first proposal, the Policy Proposal, presupposes a kind of reductionism. The 
presupposition has to be either that an agent is identical to some set (or subset) of his 
motivations, or that his agency is, such that the motivational set ‘counts,’ in some sense, 
for the agent (cf. Franklin 2018, ch. 1, §2). For instance, on the latter view, the right sort 
of motivation to want to love God ‘speaks’ for the agent, counts as the agent’s wanting 
to love God, rather than counting merely as one motivation or desire among others. It is 
an authentic expression of the agent’s own agency. The right motivational set ‘counts’ 
for the agent, or his agency, regardless of his settled dispositions or fixed character 
traits. On Michael Bratman’s account of agency, self–governing policies or quasi–
policies, such as an ideal to love God, seem to fill a role like this. Bratman holds a kind 
of ‘Lockean’ view of ‘temporally extended agency,’ and self–governing policies play an 
organizing role in supporting past– and forward–directed Lockean psychological 
connections (Bratman 2000, 50). In virtue of their role, and the agent’s ‘satisfaction’ with 
them (something like their consistency with the agent’s other self–governing policies), 
these policies count as the agent’s taking “a stand in favor of or against certain 
motivations, a stand that can itself be subject to reexamination and revision” (Bratman 
2000, 50–51).15 It would be natural for an incompatibilist agent– or agency–reductionist 
to maintain that any action indeterministically caused by the relevant set of motivations 
‘counts’ as a free action of the agent’s. My first proposal is that we could eschew the 
causal connection in every case and regard actions which are the objects of the right 
motivations as free actions. The idea is that anyone who opens himself to God’s 
indwelling grace, rendering himself capable of the beatific vision, has at least a policy–
like ideal to love God above all things (and conversely). Part of the ‘object’ of this ideal, 
perhaps implicit, is that the person be incapable of failing to love God. In the beatific 
vision, of course, the self–governing policy does not necessitate the agent’s love of God; 
but the necessitated action is that at which the self–governing policy is aimed. Since the 
action is, as it were, the natural completion of the self–governing policy, it counts as the 
agent’s own. We could say that the agent is ‘satisfied’ with the action, similarly to the 
way he is satisfied with his self–governing policies, since the action is the object of a 
                                               
15 Bratman spells out in some detail what it is for one policy to be consistent with another; I’ve tried to 
give a less technical gloss.  See Bratman 2000, pp. 50, 59-60. 
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self–governing policy with which the agent is satisfied. As such, the action is an 
expression of the agent’s own agency; it can truly be called ‘free’. Past control bestows 
present freedom because the agent controls the agent’s self–governing policies, and the 
present act is an object of one (or more) such policies with which the agent is satisfied. 
 
3.2.3. The Mystical Proposal 
 
My second proposal, the Mystical Proposal, is rather more spiritualized. It begins with 
the intuition that a person is free, even if necessitated, if he performs an act, say A2, of 
the same type as an act, say A1, that was performed earlier, and if A2 would not have 
been performed if A1 had not been performed. But this is not enough for freedom: what 
difference does it make whether the necessitated act is of the same type? So suppose 
instead that the necessitated act is the same act token. That is, suppose that at some time 
an agent is necessitated to do what he was doing, but was not necessitated to do just 
prior to that time, so much so that what he does at both times is numerically the same 
act. We can imagine cases like this. Consider, for instance, a modification to Frankfurt–
style counterexamples to PAP involving counterfactual interveners. The modification is 
that the intervener appears midway through the extended action the necessitation of 
which the intervener wants to ensure only if the agent contingently initiates it. For 
instance, suppose that whether Jones drives to DC is undetermined (prior to Jones’s 
choice), that Jones chooses to drive to DC, and that the intervener wants Jones to drive 
to DC. Once Jones chooses to drive to DC, and begins to do so, the intervener (and his 
method of intervention) magically appear. Since Jones’s action is extended across time, 
Jones can begin to, or try to, or give a sign that he is going to cease driving to DC; he can 
try to decide that he made the wrong choice or he can try to choose to do something 
else. If Jones does anything like that, the intervener intervenes and necessitates that 
Jones continues his action of driving to DC, carrying it through to completion. If, on the 
other hand, Jones does not try to choose to cease driving to DC, the intervener remains 
dormant. Regardless of what Jones tries to decide to do after he initiates the drive, he is 
necessitated to carry it through to completion. 
Now most, if not all, acts are temporally extended. If we don’t insist on an 
implausibly fine–grained analysis of human acts, some acts have a significant temporal 
duration—for instance, the act of playing a game, making dinner, or driving from New 
York to DC. Some of these acts are composite. It is not inconceivable that there are 
composite acts which can last for a significant portion of one’s life. I suspect these will 
be acts best described in more ‘abstract’ terms, such as the act of loving one’s wife. Is 
this one act, or merely a series of acts that takes place within a commitment? The latter 
doesn’t seem quite right: to love seems to involve an element of perpetual dynamism or 
activity, rather than a mere intentional commitment, and a person seems capable of 
loving another person even when he is not doing anything more ‘concrete’ for that 
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person. Perhaps, then, the former is closer to the reality. Now consider the act of loving 
God. On the Thomistic view that I endorse, love of God, or charity, is effected by “the 
infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the 
participation of Whom in us is created charity” (ST II–II.24.2). Once we welcome God’s 
sanctifying grace, such that He indwells us, we have charity, which Aquinas variously 
describes as a formal property of the soul, friendship with God, love for God, and the 
Godhead itself. I am mainly concerned with the “act of charity,” which Aquinas 
portrays as a perpetual act (see, e.g., ST II–II.23.2). For Aquinas, God is charity, and our 
participating in Him is the ‘act of charity’. On a strong reading, it is the very same 
thing—the Godhead—that constitutes and effects every act of charity. It is a 
consequence of this view that everyone who loves God performs, mystically, numerically 
the same act, not in welcoming God into his soul, but in subsequently loving God. It is 
as if God were in each and each, in some sense, participated in the other, just as the first 
person of the Trinity is in the second, and “I am in my Father, and you are in me, and I 
am in you” (Jn 14:20).16 Some people have more charity than others, but this is not 
because their act of loving God is distinct. Rather it is attenuated, since they ‘participate’ 
less in Divine Charity, which is nothing less than God Himself (ST II–II.23.2 ad 1). This 
is why Aquinas says that charity can increase, not in essence, but because “it is yet more 
in its subject” (ST II–II.24.2 ad 3). This increase is what Aquinas’s talk of ‘rectification’ of 
the soul refers to. And, finally, God is “pure act, without the admixture of any 
potentiality,” such that “it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable” (ST I.9.1; 
cf. I.2.3). Charity, considered in itself, is one pure, immutable, eternal act. 
Here a question arises: if the ‘act of charity’ is ‘God Himself,’ is an agent’s act of love 
for God the agent’s act, or God’s act? For clearly God Himself, even if He is ‘pure act,’ is 
not an act of anything, a fortiori of a creature. In Part 3.2.1, I said that the relevant directly 
free act of love for God involves a choice to cease resisting God’s offer of indwelling, 
sanctifying grace. But that act is certainly not ‘God Himself’. I shall now have to 
elaborate. The act is, in a sense, both the agent’s and God’s. It is the agent’s insofar as the 
agent, by ceasing to resist, willfully and freely opens the gates of his will, so to speak, to 
a force whose work he welcomes in him. The agent ‘participates in’ God and His work. 
But the work, the charity, is strictly speaking God’s. An imperfect, sublunary analogy 
may help. Suppose Gideon is pumping water into a hose, but Guy is holding a finger 
over the spout, preventing the water from flowing out. If Guy ‘welcomes’ Gideon’s 
activity by removing his finger, is the subsequent act of watering Guy’s or Gideon’s? 
Strictly speaking, Gideon is the one who pumps the water out. But the act is also Guy’s 
inasmuch as he welcomes it, and he can place his finger back over the spout to prevent it 
at any time. The act can truly be characterized as a directly free act of Guy’s, but a joint 
                                               
16 This, I suspect, might be the ground of a metaphysically irreducible ‘second-personal’ relation; but 
that is the subject of a different paper! 
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act, with Gideon’s necessary assistance. This is no less true if we suppose that Gideon 
just is the water. 
My Mystical Proposal is that the blessed continue the act–token of loving God which 
they performed, by participating in God’s self, immediately prior to death (and the 
beatific vision). The sight of God ‘perfects’ this charity such that, in heaven, it is 
indefectible and necessary. But because it is the very same act that was undertaken 
contingently (and that remained contingent) on earth, the blessed are free. Anyone who 
sees God was in the state of having contingent charity immediately prior to death, since 
he could not see God if he did not have charity. God’s ‘intervention’ in the beatific 
vision is not counterfactual, like the Frankfurt intervener, but it is relatively mild. God 
does not necessitate an act that was not already being performed, and given the Reasons 
constraint on inaction, the necessitation mainly involves God’s giving the blessed full 
knowledge of the reasons there are. The blessed already had reasons to love God, 
reasons on which they acted. The sight of God gives them all the reasons there are to 
love God, and removes any of the false or confused reasons they may have had to cease 
loving him. There is no manipulation involved, if manipulation involves some sort of 
deceit or fundamental alteration of a person’s agential or motivational structure. 
Furthermore, there is no character development necessary here: any good thief who 
opens himself to God, and does not subsequently close himself off, will be in paradise. 
Another (Control)–like condition can help to capture the thinking about freedom on 
display here. 
 
(Control*): Where S is necessitated to (continue to) perform act–token A in C, S 
has the right kind of control over A in C just in case (D1) A is not remotely 
determined; (D2) a necessary condition of S’s being in C is S’s A–ing immediately 
prior to S’s being in C; (D3) S’s A–ing immediately prior to S’s being in C is 
directly free, such that (D4) S had the power, through directly free actions, to 
prevent S’s being in C. 
 
Past control bestows present freedom since the control is over a past part of the token 
act whose present part is necessitated, and had the agent not perform the token act 
immediately prior to its necessitation, it would not have been necessitated. On this 
account of inancaritability, (D1) the choice to love God in the beatific vision is not 
remotely determined, since (D2) it depends on the choice to do so immediately prior to 
the beatific vision, (D3) which is directly free; and so (D4) the agent could have 
prevented being in the beatific vision by refusing to open himself to God’s indwelling 
grace, or by resisting that grace after having welcomed it. This account of 
inancaritability satisfies (B3) of the Master Account of the Beatific Vision by providing 
plausible applicability conditions for the ‘right kind’ of control referenced in (B3). But I 
have also clearly satisfied each of (B1) and (B2), meeting, therefore, every condition of 
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the master account. On my Thomistic–inspired account of inancaritability, therefore, the 
blessed are both necessitated to love God in the beatific vision, and incompatibilist–free 
in their choice to do so. 
Much more work would have to be done fully to explain my two proposals, but I 
believe that either of them blunts the sting of the Control Problem. Since I reject agent– or 
agency–reductionism, I am rather partial to the Mystical Proposal. What about the 
Universalism Problem? Well, if God cannot guarantee a directly free act, then he cannot 
guarantee the directly free act of openness to His indwelling grace. But since that act is 
required for salvation, God cannot guarantee salvation—even though anyone who has 
the beatific vision necessarily loves God. This dispenses with the Universalism Problem. 
There is a lingering question, which I promised in Part 1 to answer. Is Aquinas (as 
I’ve interpreted him) an incompatibilist or a compatibilist? Let’s ask two more specific 
questions first. Does Aquinas believe that free will is compatible with determinism? No, 
in that free will is not compatible with an agent’s every act being determined; but yes, in 
that free will is compatible with certain special cases of an act’s being determined, as in 
the beatific vision. Does Aquinas believe that free will requires the ability to do 
otherwise? Yes, in that it requires PAPdistal, but no, in that it does not require PAPnow. So I 
believe that Aquinas is an incompatibilist of a certain stripe, since free will is only 
compatible with libertarian–friendly determinism. That is, Aquinas is a sourcehood 
incompatibilist. It would be interesting to consider whether, given the unique 
'superintelligible' conditions of the beatific vision, the blessed are free but deserving of 
no merit or praise regarding their love of God. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As I see it, the account of inancaritability I’ve given has several advantages over the 
account of impeccability given by Timpe and Pawl. First, it’s a better account of 
impeccability. It entails impeccability (necessarily, anyone who cannot cease loving God 
cannot sin), and it explains impeccability by love of God, not by more generic reference 
to, say, virtuous character traits. This seems to be the right kind of explanation of the 
impeccability of the blessed. Second, my Reasons–constraint on inaction is explicit about 
how an action, and not merely an inaction, can be both free and necessitated on 
incompatibilism. Third, my account is explicitly consistent with (B1), the exceedingly 
plausible Thomistic thesis that whosoever sees God in heaven—regardless of his 
character, past choices, etc.,—cannot fail to love God. Without further elaboration, 
Timpe and Pawl’s account seems to imply that someone who sees God could sin, if he 
had the right character; but my account has the resources to block that highly 
implausible implication. In addition to these advantages, if my account is correct, then I 
may be able to contribute to the broader debate on free will by helping to clarify what 
sort of control over free actions incompatibilists should be willing to accept. In 
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particular, incompatibilists should consider the view that agents might have the right 
kind of control over act–tokens necessitated in circumstances which are brought about 
by those agents through the same non–necessitated ‘parts’ of those act–tokens. Finally, I 
think I’ve provided an intriguing avenue of exploration in relation to the theological 
problem of hell. I’ve tried to give a plausible reason to think that, despite infinite divine 
resourcefulness, God might not be able to guarantee everyone’s salvation—the reason, 
namely, that human persons have to be ‘active’ (have to perform directly free actions) in 
order to be beneficiaries of the most potent elements of divine resourcefulness in this 
regard, the elements pertaining to the necessitating vision of God Himself. Human 
beings can unfit themselves to see the truth, and it may be impossible for God to show it 
to them. 
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